Certainly when Patricia Gike rented her long-time handyman a room for two nights in Freehold, New Jersey she did not expect to bear liability for his negligent actions, which then led to a fire. Joseph Michael Wood was Ms. Gike's handyman; one afternoon he had a seizure on Ms. Gike's property. She rushed him to the hospital and when he was told that he needed to stay locally for a few days to have a follow-up medical appointment, Ms. Gike altruistically offered to rent him a hotel room.

Ms. Gike merely paid for the room, she never entered it nor did she obtain the key. However, under state regulations that govern hotels and multiple dwellings, Gike is considered an occupant of the room and, therefore, could be held liable for the actions of her guests. Mr. Woods brought a gas can to the hotel room so he could huff the gasoline. He was also smoking a cigarette in the room. He proceeded to accidently knock the gas can over, and his lit cigarette started a massive fire that caused significant damage. The hotel brought a civil suit against Ms. Gike for the damage.

A Monmouth County Superior Court Judge ruled in favor of the hotel, and found that Ms. Gike was automatically liable for the actions of Mr. Woods. The Court of Appeals affirmed that Ms. Gike was an occupant of the room under state regulations, but said that she may not necessarily be held automatically liable for the civil damages caused by Wood's negligence. This case is remanded back to Monmouth County Superior Court to rule on the issue of whether or not Ms. Gike will be found liable for Mr. Woods' negligence.

This is a reminder to everyone that rents a hotel or motel room to be mindful of the way you and your guests treat the space. By signing your name to the bill you not only assume the cost of the room but also the liability if anyone should destroy it. If anything like this has happen to you, you should contact a civil trial lawyer immediately.

The NJ Appellate Division recently held, in the case of Callo v. Allstate, that the plaintiff would not be able to collect on a $250,000.00 jury verdict against a co-student attacker from the attacker's parents' homeowners' insurance policy.

Generally, pursuant to New Jersey law, a homeowners' policy will not cover injuries sustained when its insured intends on causing the injury. Homeowners' policies are designed to cover injuries sustained when the insured homeowner engages in a negligent act, which results in another's injury. However, there is case law in New Jersey to suggest that coverage under a homeowner's policy of insurance will cover the unintended consequences of intentional acts. This means that if an insured intended on engaging in an act but did not intend the outcome of that act (i.e. personal injury) there may be coverage.

In this case, the defendant attacked the plaintiff while in school. After a trial, a jury entered a $250,000.00 verdict in favor of the girl who was attacked. The defendant's insurance company, Allstate Insurance, provided a defense to the attacker but refused to pay the jury's verdict. Instead, it filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration from the court that it owed no duty to pay the jury's verdict. The Appellate Division agreed with Allstate, and held that the attacker intended to cause significant injury to the plaintiff, and, as such, the verdict was not covered under the policy of insurance.

In a case such as this, discovery must be conducted of the parties in an effort to establish that the attacker did not cause the specific type of injury that was sustained by the victim. In this regard, argument can be made to the courts that the victim's injury was merely an unintended consequence of an intentional act. Accordingly, it is important to see an attorney who specializes in a personal injury law practice in the event you are injured by a purported intentional act or assault.

A recent unreported New Jersey Appellate Division decision reveals that a breach of a duty of care does not always give rise to liability in a negligence claim. In Ocampo v. Famco, the Appellate Division rejected a plaintiff's case wherein a sleepwalking 16 year old fell out of a 2nd story window with a nonfunctioning lock, finding that it was not reasonable for a jury to conclude that such an accident was foreseeable under the circumstances.

A viable cause of action based in negligence requires the following elements: 1. a duty to the plaintiff; 2. the breach of a duty; 3. proximate causation; and 4. damages. In the case involving the 16 year old, there is no doubt that the defendant landlord had a duty to properly maintain the subject apartment, including the window lock. Further, there was no question that the defendant landlord failed to comply with this duty by failing to ensure that the lock was functioning. Unfortunately, the plaintiff was unable to show proximate causation. Basically, under New Jersey law, proximate causation is based, in part, on the foreseeability. In this regard, an injury or damages will not be considered "proximately caused" by another's breach of duty unless a jury can conclude that such damages are "reasonably foreseeable" under the circumstances.

In the above referenced case, the Appellate Division found that because the youngest person residing in the apartment was 16 years old, a jury could not possibly conclude that one would fall out a second story window due to a nonfunctioning lock. In other words, the Appellate Division concluded that it was not foreseeable that someone 16 years older would fall out of 2nd story window due to a nonfunctioning lock.

We disagree with the Appellate Division's holding in this regard! It is just as foreseeable that an "incapacitated" 16 year old could fall out of a 2nd story window as a two or three year old child. "Incapacitated" could include a sleepwalker, a mentally incapacitated person, or someone on prescription or over the counter medication, or under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs. Is it not foreseeable that 16 year old, who is the youngest resident in the apartment, could be incapacitated under one of the above theories? We think so. Would the landlord be responsible if the neighbor's 3 year old had fallen out of the window instead? We think so. In our view, what is and is not foreseeable, as far as issues of proximate cause are concerned, should be left to the sound discretion of a jury, and as such, we believe the appellate division erred in dismissing this plaintiff's case.

In these types of cases, only an expert, experienced attorney should be retained in order to protect your rights and pursue your interests to the fullest extent the law allows, and to get the justice you deserve.

The recent unreported Appellate Division case of Dumont v. New Jersey Devils allows us to discuss the appropriate standard to be applied when one is injured as a spectator at a sporting event when being struck by a ball or puck used in the event. In Dumont, the judge threw out the plaintiff's case because, although the plaintiff was truck by the puck which left the ice during the hockey game, she was not within the area of the stadium where pucks would constitute a known or foreseeable hazard. In Dumont, the plaintiff argued that her cause of action was not based upon general negligence theories but on the fact that the New Jersey Devils failed to offer her the option of changing seats because of the risk of flying hockey pucks. On that record, the court dismissed her claim.

In general, the prevailing rule in New Jersey is that a sports facility operator has a limited duty of care, which has two components. Firstly, the operator must provide protected seating, which is "sufficient for those spectators who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion." Secondly, the operator must provide protection for spectators in "the most dangerous sections" of the arena. Schneider v. American Hockey and Ice Skating Center, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 527 (App Div 2001) The second component of the limited liability is ordinarily satisfied by the owner of the arena or stadium by placing screens behind home plate in a baseball arena and behind the hockey goals at a hockey game.

However, there are obviously multiple ways a spectator may get injured at an athletic event, other than being struck by a ball or puck. Each case must be evaluated on its independent facts. For instance, may arenas attempt to limit their liability through the use of language on the back of tickets permitting entry into the sporting event. In the advent "paperless" tickets, these issues have not been readily resolved by the courts. Accordingly, in the event of an injury sustained at a sporting event as a spectator, it is important for the injured person to get in touch with an expert personal injury attorney, who can properly identify the issues and pursue the best course of legal recovery for you.

Two cases recently decided by New Jersey's Appellate Division addressed a statute which was previously thought to provide immunity to 911 operators engaged in the course of their employment. The Appellate Division in Massachi v. City of Newark Police Department and Wilson v. City of Jersey City held that 911 operators and dispatchers could be held liable for injuries sustained or proximately cause by their failure to adhere to established protocols and guidelines. In Massachi, a female student was abducted directly outside the Seton Hall University Campus in South Orange, New Jersey. Two of her friends immediately called 911 to report the abduction. The 911 operator failed to follow the appropriate departmental procedures and guidelines in that although she put the information into the 911 computer system, she failed to note the last known location of the abductor's car, failed to note that the car was in motion, failed to record the vehicle's path of travel and mis-identified the car as a Chevy Blazer as opposed to a Plymouth Blazer. Further, she failed to keep the person reporting the crime on the phone to enable to provide an update to the responding unit.

In addition to the above, two off-duty Essex County Sheriff's Officers also witnessed the abduction and also called 911. The 911 operator that they spoke with ran the license plate of the abductor's vehicle and printed out the name and address of the vehicle's owner. Unfortunately, he failed to issue a general alert to all police units in neighboring municipalities and also failed to contact the police in the municipality where the abductor resided. It was the plaintiff's decedent's claim that the girl who was abducted was ultimately murdered due to the fact that the police units could not properly respond as a result of the 911 dispatcher's failure to comply with guidelines.

Importantly, a New Jersey statute (N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10) provides various immunities to phone carriers and dispatchers concerning the failure of the 911 system. The Appellate Division under the two cases before it, specifically held that the above-referenced statute does not afford immunity to the 911 emergency communication center or its employees where they negligently render 911 services including dispatching police to an incorrect location, failing to keep the caller on the line to update the police of the location of the perpetrator and for failing to broadcast an alert to surround municipalities. Accordingly, although there is immunity for the failure of the system to work, there will be no immunity for 911 operators or dispatchers where they fail to follow protocol.

In the event you or a family member believes you have suffered injuries as a result of improper actions of a 911 operator, it is imperative that you seek the advice of a qualified personal injury attorney.

A recent appellate case, Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, et.al., holds that a condominium association is not liable for dangerous conditions on the public sidewalk abutting the condominium association's property. This recent decision highlights the current status of New Jersey sidewalk liability law. As indicated in prior blogs, a landlord is generally responsible or legally liable for personal injuries as a result of dangerous conditions existing on its property. However, there are significant exceptions when this general rule is applied to public sidewalks within the State of New Jersey.

For purposes of personal injury liability, public sidewalks in the state of New Jersey are basically divided into two categories. The first are those that abut residential premises. The second category includes those public sidewalks that abut commercial premises. As a general rule, a homeowner or an owner of a residential premises will not be responsible for injuries which are the result of dangerous conditions on the public sidewalk abutting their premises. In this regard, it is the local public entity that will be responsible. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, such as where the owner of the residence actually creates the condition that gave rise to the injury. Further, the public entity's responsibility for injuries occurring on the public sidewalks abutting residences will be tempered (?) limited to the provisions of New Jersey's Tort Claims Act.

On the other hand, owners of commercial premises will be responsible for injuries that are sustained as a result of dangerous conditions contained within public sidewalks abutting those commercial premises. Thus, generally, owners of commercial premises have a duty to properly maintain the sidewalks that abut their property. This duty extends to the removal of ice and snow. The theory behind imposing this duty upon commercial establishments relates to the potential revenue generates by the business and shifting the risk away from the public entities.

In any event, the main difficulty in such cases is determining whether or not the property is "commercial" or "residential." For instance, should a multi-tenant apartment building be considered commercial or residential for the purposes of this analysis? Should a church be considered commercial or residential? Basically, the courts have stated that the test really is whether or not the property has the capacity to generate income. Thus, even residential properties that are owned for investment or business purposes will be classified as commercial under this analysis. Similarly, a parochial school and a fraternity house have also been held to be commercial establishments for purposes of this test.

In the recent case of Luchejko v. City of Hoboken et.al. the issue was whether or not a condominium association should be considered commercial or residential entity because the condominium complex at issue in this case was basically and predominantly an owner-occupied, and the condominium association was a "non-profit" corporation, the court considered that this complex qualified as a residential premises. Accordingly, liability was not extended. However, it appears that the Appellate Division did not provide a blanket rule that all condominium associations should be treated in the same way. Each case must be properly reviewed, examined and analyzed, given its unique facts and circumstances of the incident.

The fact sensitive nature of this type of case makes it crucial that a very skilled attorney analyze all the details and circumstances surrounding the incident that led to an injury at the first possible moment, in order to be legally successful and to sufficiently protect your rights.

The purpose of this blog is to follow up on information concerning various potential causes of action, which were discussed in our May 4, 2010 blog. In that blog, we discussed potential causes of action by one parent against another parent and by children against a parent for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress due to parental actions. Those possibilities were discussed with regard to a lawsuit that was filed against Miami Heat star Dwayne Wade by his wife during the pendency of a divorce action.

Interestingly, a day before our blog was published, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division in Segal v. Lynch discussed issues similar in nature to the Wade case as well as the issues discussed in our blog. In Segal, the father, who was a non-custodial parent of two minor children, who brought an action on behalf of his children against their mother for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Unlike the Wade case, however, the plaintiff here alleged that the basis of the infliction of emotion distress were the actions undertaken by the mother to alienate the children from the father. For instance, the plaintiff father alleged that the mother blocked all of his emails to the children, and forbade the children from emailing or otherwise contacting their father for a period greater than three months. Additionally, the father alleged that the mother told the children "false and spiteful things" about him. The father claimed that once visitation continued after this three-month period, it was clear to him that the mother's actions had a "negative impact" on his relationship with the children. In support of this claim, the father pointed to a court appointed psychologist's opinion, which determined that the mother did engage in "alienating behavior with the children."

As suspected in our prior blog, the father's claim for alienation of affections was similarly under New Jersey's Heart Balm Statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:23-1). The court then went on to discuss the proofs required to support claims of negligent and intentional emotional distress. In this regard, the court found no barrier of one parent asserting such a cause of action against another parent. However, the court's analysis went further in dealing with such a cause of action where the "best interest of the children" was the pivotal issue.

In this case of first impression, the Appellate Division cited the court's parens patriae responsibility, which requires the court to "care for and protect those unable to do so for themselves such as children." The court then balanced the "fundamental principles" of a child's best interest against the rights of civil litigants to obtain compensation for their injuries from a tortfeasor. The court acknowledged that the acknowledgment of either interest would cause detriment to the other.

In noting that the main issues in such a litigation would require the children to provide significant evidence about their relationships with their parents and, in effect, provide testimony "against" one parent or the other, the court concluded that allowing such a case to go forward would be in direct contravention to the best interest of the children. Accordingly, under the facts set forth in the plaintiff's complaint, the court dismissed the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In doing so, however, the court did not foreclosure the possibility of one parent pursuing such a cause of action. Instead, the court indicated that such an action would be better suited for the Family Part and that a Family Part Judge would be better served in evaluating and determining the "legal ethnicity" of such a cause of action in the preliminary stages of any such litigation process. It remains to be seen whether or not this matter will make its way to the Supreme Court of New Jersey to further clarify this opinion.

In any event, it would appear that the current State of New Jersey law is not far from what is set forth in our prior blog. However, the Appellate has indicated that such claims must be brought in the Family Part as opposed to the Law Division so that Family Part Judges may "weed out" cases early on in the process. Thus, the cases must handled on a "case-by-case" basis by the Family Part Judge assigned to the matter to determine whether or not a factual basis exists to go forward.

In two recent unpublished opinions, the Appellate Division imposed liability on JCP&L (Jersey Central Power and Light) for failing to properly maintain streetlights. Under two different fact patterns arising in Point Pleasant, New Jersey, the Appellate Division held that JCP&L had a duty to properly maintain overhead street lighting and could be held negligently responsible by the injured plaintiffs in each case.

In Anderson v. Davoren, the plaintiff was injured when she was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing a street in Point Pleasant. The driver of the vehicle was traveling the speed limit and claimed that he did not see the pedestrian in the crosswalk. It was undisputed that the street light in the area was not operable and both parties claimed that the insufficient lighting led to the accident. In Press v. Point Pleasant, the plaintiff was injured when she tripped and fell over a parking space barrier. Once again the overhead light was inoperable and the plaintiff claimed that it was the insufficient lighting that caused her to fall.

Under the facts presented, the court held that JCP&L, which entered into an agreement with Point Pleasant to repair and maintain public lighting, also had a duty to members of the public using the public way. Because it is reasonably foreseeable that members of the public would utilize the areas, the utility owed a duty to properly maintain the public lighting and could be held responsible where the failed lighting led to the occurrence of an incident giving rise to an injury.

These two cases are perfect examples of good lawyers establishing liability against an entity with "deep pockets" where there may not have been a sufficient case against a primary tortfeasor. For instance there may be situations where the primary tortfeasor was protected by some type of
immunity or had insufficient insurance coverage to properly compensate the plaintiff.