New Jersey Injury Lawyer Blog

Two cases recently decided by New Jersey's Appellate Division addressed a statute which was previously thought to provide immunity to 911 operators engaged in the course of their employment. The Appellate Division in Massachi v. City of Newark Police Department and Wilson v. City of Jersey City held that 911 operators and dispatchers could be held liable for injuries sustained or proximately cause by their failure to adhere to established protocols and guidelines. In Massachi, a female student was abducted directly outside the Seton Hall University Campus in South Orange, New Jersey. Two of her friends immediately called 911 to report the abduction. The 911 operator failed to follow the appropriate departmental procedures and guidelines in that although she put the information into the 911 computer system, she failed to note the last known location of the abductor's car, failed to note that the car was in motion, failed to record the vehicle's path of travel and mis-identified the car as a Chevy Blazer as opposed to a Plymouth Blazer. Further, she failed to keep the person reporting the crime on the phone to enable to provide an update to the responding unit.

In addition to the above, two off-duty Essex County Sheriff's Officers also witnessed the abduction and also called 911. The 911 operator that they spoke with ran the license plate of the abductor's vehicle and printed out the name and address of the vehicle's owner. Unfortunately, he failed to issue a general alert to all police units in neighboring municipalities and also failed to contact the police in the municipality where the abductor resided. It was the plaintiff's decedent's claim that the girl who was abducted was ultimately murdered due to the fact that the police units could not properly respond as a result of the 911 dispatcher's failure to comply with guidelines.

Importantly, a New Jersey statute (N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10) provides various immunities to phone carriers and dispatchers concerning the failure of the 911 system. The Appellate Division under the two cases before it, specifically held that the above-referenced statute does not afford immunity to the 911 emergency communication center or its employees where they negligently render 911 services including dispatching police to an incorrect location, failing to keep the caller on the line to update the police of the location of the perpetrator and for failing to broadcast an alert to surround municipalities. Accordingly, although there is immunity for the failure of the system to work, there will be no immunity for 911 operators or dispatchers where they fail to follow protocol.

In the event you or a family member believes you have suffered injuries as a result of improper actions of a 911 operator, it is imperative that you seek the advice of a qualified personal injury attorney.

A recent appellate case, Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, et.al., holds that a condominium association is not liable for dangerous conditions on the public sidewalk abutting the condominium association's property. This recent decision highlights the current status of New Jersey sidewalk liability law. As indicated in prior blogs, a landlord is generally responsible or legally liable for personal injuries as a result of dangerous conditions existing on its property. However, there are significant exceptions when this general rule is applied to public sidewalks within the State of New Jersey.

For purposes of personal injury liability, public sidewalks in the state of New Jersey are basically divided into two categories. The first are those that abut residential premises. The second category includes those public sidewalks that abut commercial premises. As a general rule, a homeowner or an owner of a residential premises will not be responsible for injuries which are the result of dangerous conditions on the public sidewalk abutting their premises. In this regard, it is the local public entity that will be responsible. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, such as where the owner of the residence actually creates the condition that gave rise to the injury. Further, the public entity's responsibility for injuries occurring on the public sidewalks abutting residences will be tempered (?) limited to the provisions of New Jersey's Tort Claims Act.

On the other hand, owners of commercial premises will be responsible for injuries that are sustained as a result of dangerous conditions contained within public sidewalks abutting those commercial premises. Thus, generally, owners of commercial premises have a duty to properly maintain the sidewalks that abut their property. This duty extends to the removal of ice and snow. The theory behind imposing this duty upon commercial establishments relates to the potential revenue generates by the business and shifting the risk away from the public entities.

In any event, the main difficulty in such cases is determining whether or not the property is "commercial" or "residential." For instance, should a multi-tenant apartment building be considered commercial or residential for the purposes of this analysis? Should a church be considered commercial or residential? Basically, the courts have stated that the test really is whether or not the property has the capacity to generate income. Thus, even residential properties that are owned for investment or business purposes will be classified as commercial under this analysis. Similarly, a parochial school and a fraternity house have also been held to be commercial establishments for purposes of this test.

In the recent case of Luchejko v. City of Hoboken et.al. the issue was whether or not a condominium association should be considered commercial or residential entity because the condominium complex at issue in this case was basically and predominantly an owner-occupied, and the condominium association was a "non-profit" corporation, the court considered that this complex qualified as a residential premises. Accordingly, liability was not extended. However, it appears that the Appellate Division did not provide a blanket rule that all condominium associations should be treated in the same way. Each case must be properly reviewed, examined and analyzed, given its unique facts and circumstances of the incident.

The fact sensitive nature of this type of case makes it crucial that a very skilled attorney analyze all the details and circumstances surrounding the incident that led to an injury at the first possible moment, in order to be legally successful and to sufficiently protect your rights.

The purpose of this blog is to follow up on information concerning various potential causes of action, which were discussed in our May 4, 2010 blog. In that blog, we discussed potential causes of action by one parent against another parent and by children against a parent for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress due to parental actions. Those possibilities were discussed with regard to a lawsuit that was filed against Miami Heat star Dwayne Wade by his wife during the pendency of a divorce action.

Interestingly, a day before our blog was published, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division in Segal v. Lynch discussed issues similar in nature to the Wade case as well as the issues discussed in our blog. In Segal, the father, who was a non-custodial parent of two minor children, who brought an action on behalf of his children against their mother for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Unlike the Wade case, however, the plaintiff here alleged that the basis of the infliction of emotion distress were the actions undertaken by the mother to alienate the children from the father. For instance, the plaintiff father alleged that the mother blocked all of his emails to the children, and forbade the children from emailing or otherwise contacting their father for a period greater than three months. Additionally, the father alleged that the mother told the children "false and spiteful things" about him. The father claimed that once visitation continued after this three-month period, it was clear to him that the mother's actions had a "negative impact" on his relationship with the children. In support of this claim, the father pointed to a court appointed psychologist's opinion, which determined that the mother did engage in "alienating behavior with the children."

As suspected in our prior blog, the father's claim for alienation of affections was similarly under New Jersey's Heart Balm Statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:23-1). The court then went on to discuss the proofs required to support claims of negligent and intentional emotional distress. In this regard, the court found no barrier of one parent asserting such a cause of action against another parent. However, the court's analysis went further in dealing with such a cause of action where the "best interest of the children" was the pivotal issue.

In this case of first impression, the Appellate Division cited the court's parens patriae responsibility, which requires the court to "care for and protect those unable to do so for themselves such as children." The court then balanced the "fundamental principles" of a child's best interest against the rights of civil litigants to obtain compensation for their injuries from a tortfeasor. The court acknowledged that the acknowledgment of either interest would cause detriment to the other.

In noting that the main issues in such a litigation would require the children to provide significant evidence about their relationships with their parents and, in effect, provide testimony "against" one parent or the other, the court concluded that allowing such a case to go forward would be in direct contravention to the best interest of the children. Accordingly, under the facts set forth in the plaintiff's complaint, the court dismissed the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In doing so, however, the court did not foreclosure the possibility of one parent pursuing such a cause of action. Instead, the court indicated that such an action would be better suited for the Family Part and that a Family Part Judge would be better served in evaluating and determining the "legal ethnicity" of such a cause of action in the preliminary stages of any such litigation process. It remains to be seen whether or not this matter will make its way to the Supreme Court of New Jersey to further clarify this opinion.

In any event, it would appear that the current State of New Jersey law is not far from what is set forth in our prior blog. However, the Appellate has indicated that such claims must be brought in the Family Part as opposed to the Law Division so that Family Part Judges may "weed out" cases early on in the process. Thus, the cases must handled on a "case-by-case" basis by the Family Part Judge assigned to the matter to determine whether or not a factual basis exists to go forward.

In two recent unpublished opinions, the Appellate Division imposed liability on JCP&L (Jersey Central Power and Light) for failing to properly maintain streetlights. Under two different fact patterns arising in Point Pleasant, New Jersey, the Appellate Division held that JCP&L had a duty to properly maintain overhead street lighting and could be held negligently responsible by the injured plaintiffs in each case.

In Anderson v. Davoren, the plaintiff was injured when she was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing a street in Point Pleasant. The driver of the vehicle was traveling the speed limit and claimed that he did not see the pedestrian in the crosswalk. It was undisputed that the street light in the area was not operable and both parties claimed that the insufficient lighting led to the accident. In Press v. Point Pleasant, the plaintiff was injured when she tripped and fell over a parking space barrier. Once again the overhead light was inoperable and the plaintiff claimed that it was the insufficient lighting that caused her to fall.

Under the facts presented, the court held that JCP&L, which entered into an agreement with Point Pleasant to repair and maintain public lighting, also had a duty to members of the public using the public way. Because it is reasonably foreseeable that members of the public would utilize the areas, the utility owed a duty to properly maintain the public lighting and could be held responsible where the failed lighting led to the occurrence of an incident giving rise to an injury.

These two cases are perfect examples of good lawyers establishing liability against an entity with "deep pockets" where there may not have been a sufficient case against a primary tortfeasor. For instance there may be situations where the primary tortfeasor was protected by some type of
immunity or had insufficient insurance coverage to properly compensate the plaintiff.